Controlling what we see and do in complex environments depends upon the interaction of topdown control mechanisms located in the prefrontal cortex, on the one hand, and bottom-up competition between objects for limited perceptual resources in posterior cortical areas, on the other.
In the first phase of bewilderment, you may just stare blankly without plan or thought, leaving the scores of objects filling your vision to engage in an undignified struggle for selection as the object of your conscious attention. In your passive state, you may end up staring at the battery, which has won the competition simply by virtue of being bright yellow in contrast to the dull grey of the rest of the engine. Duncan's theory of integrated competition [1] argues that this strong differentiation by a primary perceptual feature will strengthen the representations in the brain of all other features possessed by that one object, such as shape, orientation and motion (the car is rocking gently as you pound it with your fist...). Your experience of attending to the yellow cuboid is an endproduct of competition by objects for neural resourcesin other words, visual attention is a state into which the visual system settles.
But others argue that, far from being an end-product, attention is an active control process -the very glue that binds together the elementary features, colour, orientation, motion, and so on, which are separately processed in distinct areas of the brain. In a complex visual field, how does the yellowness of the battery become linked to its shape, if these attributes are processed in different areas of the brain? Why does not the blackness of the distributor cap 'attach' itself to the battery's cuboid shape? In fact, such 'illusory conjunctions' can happen, particularly when people are made to maintain a diffuse spread of non-focussed attention to a visual array while reporting the shape, size, colour or shading of a designated object [2] . Without the ability to spatially focus visual attention, features belonging to separate objects 'migrate' and are erroneously reported as being attributes of other objects -in effect the battery is seen as being black.
Such migration has been observed in a person suffering bilateral lesions to the parietal cortex [3] . While this person was well able to find a specified colour in a complex visual array, or a specific shape, he had great difficulty in searching for objects specified by a combination of two features -being red and circular, for exampleimplicating the parietal cortices as the location of the spatial attention needed to 'glue' these features together. There is also support from functional brain imaging of normal subjects for a role of the superior parietal cortex in such a conjunction search. Corbetta et al. [4] found that while searching for a stimulus defined by only colour or motion did not activate superior parietal cortex, searching for a stimulus defined by colour and motion together did specifically activate these parietal areas.
The use of attention as a feature-binding mechanism implies there is an item-by-item, serial search of complex visual arrays in which targets are defined by combinations of features. Visual search data show that each serial re-fixation must take tens of milliseconds, yet when visual stimuli are presented rapidly and sequentially at a fixed spatial location, the interference caused by target selection lasts hundreds of milliseconds [5] . In other words, having just stared hopelessly at the battery, it will take a few hundred milliseconds before you can detach your attention from it in order to stare hopelessly at the distributor cap. This 'attentional blink', if applied to the serial search paradigms of Treisman, would result in conjunction search times many times longer than those actually found. This discrepancy remains to be resolved.
There is only so much that you can take in while staring at the engine. Duncan [1] and Lavie [6] , among many others, argue that we have a limited perceptual capacity that governs how much we can process visually. Lavie [6] , in particular, argues that all stimuli will be processed automatically up until the limit set by a fixed perceptual capacity. Under high perceptual load conditions (you are straining your eyes to see whether there is any water in the battery...) you will process less peripheral information than under low-load conditions (you are back staring hopelessly at the battery...).
This hypothesis was elegantly supported in a positron emission tomography (PET) study in which subjects were given either a high-load or a low-load central task involving monitoring words for predetermined targets [7] . Simultaneously, subjects were presented with a peripheral, radially-moving stimulus, known to activate the visual motion brain area V5. If Lavie were right, then with a high central perceptual load, V5 should not be activated, as the peripheral stimuli causing its activation would not be processed. This is precisely what was found: only with the visually similar, but perceptually less demanding, task was V5 activation found, indicating that the peripheral moving stimulus had been processed by the residual perceptual capacity only available in the low-load condition.
Noticing the distributor cap, because you have given up the high perceptual load task of peering into the battery water, prompts you to think about other parts of the engine. This triggers a vague memory about starter motors, and you scan the engine with the help of a halfremembered mental picture of what one looks like, dredged from long-term memory. Now the competition for your limited processing capacity begins again, but this time the image of the starter motor held in working memory in your frontal cortex biases the competition for objects that approximate to the shape and location of the starter motor. Such top-down biasing of the competition between objects gives an advantage to objects that have starter-motor-type features, which then more easily win the race for awareness.
In macaque monkeys, attention to a target object increases the firing rate of cells in the inferior temporal cortex that are sensitive to that object [8] . You finally 'see' the starter motor, therefore, because the cells that code for its constituent features are firing more rapidly; when these features cross the retina, suprathreshold detection and competition-winning awareness of the object results. Had you had no idea about the starter motor's shape, but did know its likely location, then the cells coding that location could have been primed in a similar way, again resulting in faster detection.
Starter motors sometimes jam, you suddenly remember. Reaching for the hammer in the toolbox, your fingers shape exquisitely to the handle's precise diameter and orientation just before making contact. This is because visual information is made directly available to the motor system, information which is unavailable to conscious awareness. We know this, in part because of a patient whose brain damage left her with a profound difficulty in perceiving and discriminating simple shapes and orientations, yet who had a normal ability to orient her hand when reaching to 'post' a hand-held plaque through a slot placed at different orientations [9] . A network that includes the posterior parietal cortex may be critical in the provision of direct visuo-motor links for the control of complex actions in the environment, unaccompanied by conscious awareness. Indeed, cells have been located in the anterior part of the intraparietal sulcus that are not selective for location, but are selective for specific visual stimuli, and firing of these cells is also associated with particular motor acts, such as grasping [10] .
You lift the hammer, tap the starter motor and switch on the engine. It bursts delightfully into life. You leap into the car and speed off to work. There is only one problem.
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Figure 1
A top-down view of the brain, showing areas of activation during a sustained attention task, as revealed by a PET scan. This is one of many findings showing that, during sustained attention to monotonous tasks, there is preferential activation in the right hemisphere, in particular in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (top right, arrow) and right superior parietal cortex (bottom right, arrow). Reproduced with permission from [13] .
You left your toolbox in the middle of the pavement. Absent-mindedness in daily life is predicted by deficits in sustaining attention on laboratory tests [11] . Solving any non-trivial problem requires the capacity to sustain attention to the task over extended periods, and this ability resides in part in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [12] , and usually also in the superior parietal cortex (Figure 1 ). Such common, everyday errors in the control of behaviour reveal the complexities of the underlying neural processes, which, although more clearly delineated as a result of research over the last five years, are still understood only to a limited degree. Using the combined methodologies of functional imaging, experimental neuropsychology and single-cell recording from awake, behaving animals, however, this understanding will surely grow substantially over the next decade.
